


ПОЛИТИЧЕСКИЕ НАУКИ



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Perspective of V.I. Lenin about political commissars, political instructors and one-chief regime in the Red Army

Abstract. According to the perspective of V.I. Lenin, political commissars and political instructors in the Red Army have an important position and role, are the representatives of the Bolshevik Party - the Communist Party (b) of Russia (*The letter (b) is an acronym for Bolshevik*) who directly build the political-spiritual factor, education, practice and military discipline and contributing to enhancing the general quality, strength and combat of the army and are typical persons in terms of quality, competence and working style. At the same time, V.I. Lenin pointed out the implementation of the one-chief regime as an important and indispensable principle in the construction and operation of the Soviet armed forces in order to well implement the one-chief regime, it is crucial to thoroughly grasp the class perspective in selecting, educating, fostering and using commanding officers. Such perspective of V.I. Lenin was used creatively by the Russian Communist Party (b) in the practice of building the Red Army.

Key words. V.I. Lenin's perspective; political commissars, political instructors; one-chief regime.

After the Russian October Revolution in 1917, in the face of the danger of enemies inside and outside who intended to strangle the young Soviet government, to maintain the results of the revolution, V.I. Lenin issued an Ordinance to organize the Red Army of the Peasants and Farmers, the Navy and pointed out: "The stability of the Republic in the fight against the empire and the victory of socialism in Russia and around the world depend on the strengthening of the Army" [5, p. 114]. At that time, commanders of Army units, a few were from agriculture, and most were former army officers of the Russian Imperial Army. Under such conditions and under the

leadership of V.I. Lenin and the Communist Party (b) Russia mobilized thousands of elite party members to serve as political commissars, political instructors political and "used old military experts to be appointed to command positions of revolutionary soldiers and sailors as well as representatives of the working class who had just got acquainted with military work" [1, p. 75]. V.I. Lenin's perspective on political commissars, political instructors and one-chief regime in the Red Army was showed in the following basic issues:

1. V.I. Lenin's perspective on political commissars and political instructors in the Red Army

1.1. Political commissars and political instructors are representatives of the Communist Party and ensure all activities of the Army comply with the guideline of the Communist Party

The VIII Congress of the Communist Party (b) of Russia (March 1919), under the chairmanship of V.I. Lenin, determined: "There must be political commissars who are trustworthy and selfless communist party members placed alongside the military commanders and establish communist branches within each unit to establish internal ideological links and self-discipline" [6, p. 513]. "Political instructors in the Army were not only the real and direct representatives of the Soviet government, but first of all who showed the spirit of our Party, demonstrated the discipline, determination and courage of the Party in the struggle for the intended purpose" [2, p. 101-102]. According to V.I. Lenin, the main and core factor in the quality of political commissars and political instructors is the level of political enlightenment, infinite faith in the communist ideology, the Communist Party, the proletariat State and the Socialist Nation and are people with revolutionary morality. Political commissars are empowered to decide; all the orders without confirmation of the political commissars are not executed in order to ensure that the orders of the commander and the unit's activities are not contrary to the Party's guidelines and policies.

1.2. Political commissars and political instructors are the ones who directly build the political - spiritual factor; education, training, military discipline, contributing to improving the overall quality and strength; and fight to ensure the survival and development of the Army

From the practice of political work of political commissars and political instructors in military units and fleets, V.I. Lenin drew out the conclusion: "Without political commissars, we wouldn't have the Red Army" [9, p. 179]. "Where the politics in the army and the work of political commissars are done most carefully..., there is no lax in the army, the army has better maintained order,

and their morale is also higher; there is more victory" [7, p. 66]. V.I. Lenin affirmed: "We have an army. That army has a new discipline. This discipline has been maintained by Party cells, workers and political commissars. That is the reason for the transformation in our Army" [4, p. 470].

To fulfill the responsibility for building and consolidating military discipline of the unit, V.I. Lenin required political commissars and political instructors to thoroughly understand laws, ordinances and exemplarily observe the regulations, know how to properly combine and correctly apply all methods of education, persuasion and administration, which are compulsory. "Political instructors will be responsible to the unit's political commissars for political education for soldiers in the company... have to go to class on political matters, organize newsgroups, appeals, brochures and talking to Red Army soldiers..." [1, p. 65]. To maintain the consolidation of military discipline, political commissars and political instructors must be "strict", or must maintain and strictly comply with military orders, and are not allowed to make even the smallest mistake.

1.3. Political commissars and political instructors are those who exemplify political qualities and are selected from elite communist party members; have a deep understanding of revolutionary theory; have professional qualifications and military expertise

V.I. Lenin pointed out, political commissars and political instructors must be representatives of political quality, selected from elite communist party members; need to organize for them to study and study important political theoretical documents of the Communist Party and the decisions of the Government; for them, learning was not only a need but also a responsibility and a lofty moral obligation. He requested political commissars and political instructors to be capable of organizing the following activities: educate, persuade the masses; conduct party work, union work; know with confidence in the party organization, the commanding officers, the union organization,

wisely take advantage of the great strength of commanders, Party members, union members, support and promote a positive and proactive spirit, their creations. At the same time, they must be good organizers, “we know how to organize propaganda and advocacy everywhere” [8, p. 210], know how to make people obey the resolutions and directives of the Communist Party, orders of commanders, and motivate them to complete combat duties in all difficult and complicated situations.

Political commissars and political instructors must also be good military experts with the necessary capacity of military commanders to be able to cooperate closely with the commander, helping them complete their military training tasks and improve the unit's combat readiness and combat strength. To meet such requirement, each political commissars must regularly research and improve their knowledge of military tactics, military science and art, firmly grasp the principles of combat organization and commanding skills which are needed to keep up with the development of armed weapons, military engineering, and military art science.

1.4. Always appreciate convincing education; work under plan, choose breakthrough stage; mingle, and stick with the masses

According to V.I. Lenin, to convince all soldiers and encourage them to follow him, political commissars and political instructors not only need to have knowledge, but he advised: “Firstly, you have to persuade and then force it. Any way, we must first persuade and then force it” [10, p. 65], personal exemplary is a requirement and a characteristic of the working style of political commissars, political instructors, politicians, political officers, commanders and communist members. One of the working methods and styles that V.I. Lenin regularly instructed cadres, party members, political cadres in general and political commissars in particular was to regularly follow the practice of the socialist revolution, army construction and combat missions. He resolutely

resisted abstract slogans, clichés and general arguments.

V.I. Lenin taught political commissars and political instructors in their work to know to set their tasks in a timely, clear, accurate manner, correctly identified and cleverly combined working forms and measures. When performing any of the unit's tasks, it is required to immediately determine the measures of party work, political work to turn those tasks into reality; “The whole art of a politician is to find the link, firmly grasping that link, and mastering the whole chain” [3, p. 209-210]. V.I. Lenin asked political commissars and political instructors to closely follow their soldiers, know their needs, their moods and promptly resolve their legitimate needs and aspirations.

2. V.I. Lenin's perspective on the one-chief regime in the Red Army

2.1. Implementation of the one-chief regime is an important and indispensable principle in the construction and operation of the Soviet armed forces.

After the victory of the October Revolution, V.I. Lenin and the Communist Party (b) of Russia proposed the Military Platform of the proletariat in new terms; implemented a series of measures to improve military organization, strengthened party work activities, political work; proposed the implementation of the one-chief regime “which is the most secure regime for the best use of human capabilities and the inspection of work in practice, not on words” [8, p. 88], is an important principle in construction and operation of the Soviet armed forces. Here, the collective leadership regime and the dialectical unification of one-chief form a balanced system of military leadership.

V.I. Lenin gave the idea of the historic mission of the Red Army placed on the shoulders of red soldiers and affirmed: “Only Red Army officers have prestige in the army and can reinforce socialism in our army. Such an army will be invincible” [5, p. 241]. V.I. Lenin has scientifically explained the inevitability of the one-captain system in the army and the Red Army that in the military field more than any other field, the co-

herent operational unity of the masses is needed, subjecting the will of thousands to the will of one person; “Whether we are members of the committees in charge, vice chairmen, or political commissars, we must have a personal system in charge: If the collective leadership regime is necessary in discussing fundamental issues, it is also necessary to have personal responsibility and personal control to avoid the phenomenon of marginalization and evasion of responsibility” [7, p. 486], “The phenomenon of irresponsibility, under the pretext of collective leadership, is the most dangerous to all those who have never had a lot of practical collective work experience, and often, in military affairs, the phenomenon of irresponsibility of course leads to catastrophe to a state of dispersed power, to failure [7, p. 53].

On the other hand, the one-chief regime not only does not negate the form of collective leadership in certain stages of the military organization, but also incorporates the form of collective leadership; allows the effective use of military theoretical knowledge, techniques, experience, organizational capacity and other qualities of military personnel; ensures the most flexible and effective centralized command; brings into play the polarity, initiative and assertiveness of the commanders in their decision-making and implementation; makes the most use of the sense, responsibility, and discipline of each soldier when obeying the command of the commanders; allows to focus the efforts and will of commanders, political officers and the whole unit, and creates a high unity of will and action.

2.2. Regularly grasp the view of class in selecting, educating, fostering and using commanding officers

After gaining power, V.I. Lenin and the Soviet government attached great importance to building a large regular Red Army; “Interested in training and education, the red commanders ... And the commanders who are the core of the Army and Fleet” [1, p. 75]. To well perform that task, it is necessary to have a class perspective in selecting, educating, fostering and employing com-

manders and heads and educate communism for them “in the most complex issues in the construction of the Soviet Army” [1, p. 177]; and organize a military school system to train red officers. “If in March 1918 there were 13 classes of commanders, by January 1919 there were 63 military schools and by January 1920 there were 91 schools” [1, p. 75].

Thanks to the efforts of the Communist Party, the Central Committee of the Party, led by V.I. Lenin, in the years 1918-1920 successfully solved the problem of building Party apparatus and politics; trained a contingent of officers who knew about party organization, political work in the Soviet Army. The basic operating directions of the machine are to educate the soldiers to be aware of their class, to increase the combat strength and discipline of the Army, to ensure that the soldiers are willing to sacrifice selfless in battles against enemy soldiers. V.I. Lenin affirmed: “The military's fighting strength depends on their loyalty to the Party and working class, on their political maturity” [1, p. 75].

The training and education of commanding staff from workers and peasants, loyal to the Communist Party (b) of Russia and the Soviet government, capable of combining military and political leadership, allowing even during the civil war years to raise the issue of the one-chief regime in agencies, soldiers, and corps where the commanders are Communist Party members.

2.3. The Communist Party (b) of Russia creatively applies V.I. Lenin's views on political commissars, political instructors and one-chief regime in the construction of the Red Army.

Immediately after gaining power, to exercise the absolute and direct leadership in all aspects of the Party towards the Red Army, V.I. Lenin and the Communist Party (b) of Russia advocated the establishment of a political commissars, political instructors system besides the commander and party organizations in the Red Army. “The system of political commissars was initially built in

October 1917, decided by the Revolutionary Military Commission in military units, fleets, and military offices, as directed by V.I. Lenin was implemented in the Red Army in April 1918" [1, p. 63]. According to the all-Russian political commissars report, in 1918 alone, more than 3,200 communist members were appointed to the political office; "in December 1918, there were 6,389 commissars working in the Army" [1, p. 64]. To assist the regimental political commissars in carrying out political work in the detachments, "on October 14, 1919, the Military Council of the Republic established the position of political instructors in companies, batteries, cavalry company and special armies" [1, p. 65]. In fact, V.I. Lenin and the Communist Party (b) of Russia successfully solved the problem of selecting, training, fostering and building a contingent of political commissars and political instructors with full qualities and capacities to effectively operating the Red Army, political commissars and political instructors contributed directly to building the mighty Red Army.

On the basis of V.I. Lenin's proposal, "The first time the issue of switching to the one-chief system was raised at the Eighth Party Congress - March 1919; ... admitting the form of consecration was the most reasonable military. This issue is discussed in more detail at the Conference of Military Deputies at the Ninth Congress of the Communist Party (b) of Russia - April 1920" [1, p. 183]. However, due to the conditions of the civil war and the heterogeneous class composition; the difference in the level of military knowledge and especially because the commanders are not politically mature, so it is not allowed to practice the one-chief regime everywhere; This issue was done gradually, starting with the Military Council and in some units of the Red Army ... "At the end of 1919 - 1920, on the basis of the orders of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, a series of commanders, divisions, brigades, regiments and some corps, communist members empowered to commanders - political commissars and replaced military council members

who were deputy commanders in charge of politics" [1, p. 80].

During the civil war years, political officers and party organizations were the main organizers and educators of the Red Army, while the commanders were mainly in charge of practical work, in the postwar years, especially after the implementation of the one-chief regime, the command of the Red Army was brought to the fore by the builders and educators of the armed forces of the Soviet state. The Chief of the Political Bureau of the Red Army Revolutionary Council affirmed: "... commanding officer - it is the main force, the force that builds up the Red Army of Industry and Agriculture" [1, p. 178].

Based on his initial experience with the regime of one chief among the armed forces, in January 1920, V.I. Lenin stated: "We need to think carefully about that experience. Develop in accordance with the rules, that experience has undergone the leadership collective regime from randomness and ambiguity to become a deeply organized regime in all organs of the army, and so far, - this is a general trend, - is the one-chief regime, the only correct working method" [8, p. 89].

After V.I. Lenin's death, the Communist Party (b) of Russia continued to establish a monarchy in the Red Army. To that end, the Soviet Army intensified the training of commanders capable of leading both militarily and politically to ensure that the class composition and the party composition of the commanders would be improved. "In 1924, the number of party members in company commanders accounted for 41.5%; the number of members in the regimental cadres accounted for 41%, the division 45%, and the brigade 85%. The majority of commanders were workers" [1, p. 183]. In June 1924, the Central Committee of the Party organized a committee headed by the A.X. Bupnovui to be responsible for drafting proposals for the implementation of the monarchy. Inheriting, supplementing and developing the views of V.I. Lenin, the Communist Party (b) of Russia determines

that the one-chief system has incomplete and complete forms:

“1) In an incomplete form... the commanding officer is concentrated in combat, administrative and economic responsibilities. As for the political commissars, the political party leader is responsible for the political situation - ideology and fighting spirit of the soldiers. The reason for this form is because not all commanders have been trained to lead the army alone. 2) In its full form ... commanding officers are not only in charge of combat, administration, economics but also party affairs, political work, fighting spirit, politics - thought of soldiers (called commanders and political commissars). This commander has a political helper” [1, p. 184].

In March 1925, the Soviet Revolutionary Military Council, on the basis of the instructions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, issued an order on the implementation of the one-chief regime in the Red Army. On May 12, 1927, the Central Committee of the Communist Party considered the issue of “political leadership in the Red Army” and “acknowledged the need to significantly expand the first form - the form is not enough of the one-chief regime; enhancing the responsibilities of the commanders for the life and activities of the Army, while maintaining political commissars to lead the Army in party work and political work” [1, p. 185].

In the early years of the one-chief system, there were some views that the one-chief regime lowered the role of political work and political officers in the Army and Fleet; others believed that the commanders withdraw from political work, education and this work was completely focused on the

hands of political officers. “Both types of opinions distort the nature of the one-chief system of the Soviet Army, which requires strengthening party work, political work, and ensuring the leadership of the Communist Party in all activities and life of the Red Army and the compulsory participation of commanders in soldier education” [1, p. 186]. In February 1929, the Party Central Committee summarized: “During the military reform period in 1924, we achieved great results in improving the political and military qualifications of our head commanders, thanks to that result, now, the Military Council of the Red Army Revolution had politically stable commanders - chiefs, completely guaranteeing the Army's fighting strength as a tool of the proletariat” [1, p. 188].

Conclusion: The perspective of political commissars, political instructors and one-chief regime is an important content in V.I. Lenin's ideologies on political military construction - An extremely valuable ideological and theoretical legacy of the army of socialist countries. The continuation of research, protection and development and creative application of this perspective of V.I. Lenin in the new situation has important implications in terms of worldview, methodology and ideology; is the theoretical basis to criticize the views that deny the class nature of the war and the military. V.I. Lenin's perspective on political commissars, political instructors and one-chief regime was studied and applied creatively and flexibly by President Ho Chi Minh and the Communist Party of Vietnam in the process of building, fighting and growth of the Vietnam People's Army, especially in the current period.

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